What Does "Omission to Act" Mean? A Linguistic and Common Law Analysis to Determine Its Indonesian Equivalent

In legal translation, the most challenging problems often arise from terms that appear simple at first glance. One such term is omission to act.

From a lexical standpoint, a translator may be tempted to choose kelalaian bertindak (negligence in acting), keengganan bertindak (reluctance to act), kegagalan bertindak (failure to act), or ketiadaan tindakan (absence of action). All four may sound reasonable in Indonesian.

But do they all truly convey the same legal concept?

Answering this question requires more than consulting a general dictionary. The term must be examined from two perspectives at once: its linguistic meaning, as recorded in a standard legal dictionary, and its place in the American common law doctrine of the duty to act.

For clients, this question is not merely academic. When omission to act appears in a contract, an indemnity clause, an insurance policy, or a court document, the choice of its Indonesian equivalent can determine who bears a loss. This article therefore examines the term in three steps: what it means, when it creates legal liability, and what can happen to a client when it is mistranslated.

An Illustration

Imagine A, a lifeguard from New York, on vacation in Florida. He is relaxing by the hotel swimming pool.

At that moment, B, a hotel guest who cannot swim, falls into the pool.

A sees what happens. As a trained lifeguard, A has the ability to rescue B. However, A is on vacation and is not on duty as a lifeguard. He makes no attempt at a rescue.

B ultimately drowns.

Morally, A's conduct may be difficult to accept. A person who is capable of saving another's life but chooses to do nothing may be regarded as acting in a deeply improper manner.

The legal inquiry, however, does not end with a moral judgment. Under the traditional common law principle, the decisive question is instead:

Did A have a legal duty to act?

That question is also the key to understanding the meaning of omission.

Linguistic Analysis: What Does Omission Actually Denote?

Linguistically, omission is a noun. In general usage, it refers to something that is not done, not included, not mentioned, or left out.

A standard legal dictionary confirms this core meaning. Black's Law Dictionary lists several senses of omission, two of which are directly relevant here (Garner 2014:1260):

1. The state of having been left out or of not having been done.

2. Something that is left out, left undone, or otherwise neglected <the many omissions from the list were unintentional>.

In the context of this article, the relevant parts of these definitions are "the state of … not having been done" (sense 3) and "something that is … left undone, or otherwise neglected" (sense 4). Sense 3 describes omission as a state: an act has not been done. Sense 4 describes omission as the thing itself: the act that has been left undone. Both senses point to the same core semantic component, namely the non-occurrence of an act.

One word in sense 4 deserves comment: neglected. Here, neglected is used in its ordinary lexical sense of "left unattended" or "not dealt with." It is not a reference to negligence as a legal standard of fault, which Black's Law Dictionary treats under a separate entry. The illustrative phrase confirms this reading: the omissions from the list were unintentional, yet nothing in the example suggests that anyone was legally at fault.

Legal reference works on Anglo-American criminal law describe omission in the same way. The Legal Information Institute (LII) at Cornell Law School defines an omission as a failure to act in circumstances where there is a responsibility to act (Legal Information Institute n.d.-a). In its discussion of actus reus, the LII likewise describes an omission as a failure to act (Legal Information Institute n.d.-b).

The two definitions, however, differ in scope. Garner's definition is general: it describes something not done, without requiring any responsibility to act. The LII definition is narrower: it describes a failure to act in circumstances where a responsibility to act exists. As explained below, this difference is the key to understanding the term logically.

An important point follows from these definitions: the word omission itself does not describe a person's state of mind.

If we say that A committed an omission, that statement does not yet tell us:

• whether A was reluctant to act;

• whether A intentionally refrained from acting;

• whether A forgot to act;

• whether A was afraid to act;

• whether A did not know what to do; or

• whether A believed he had no obligation to act.

Omission primarily denotes the absence of an act, not the psychological reason behind that absence. Garner's illustrative phrase makes the same point from another angle: an omission may be unintentional, which means intention is not part of the word's meaning.

This distinction is crucial in translation.

Why Not Keengganan Bertindak?

In Indonesian, keengganan carries a psychological component of meaning.

If we say A enggan menolong B (A is reluctant to help B), we are not merely saying that A did not help B. We are also saying something about A's attitude toward that act: A was unwilling or did not wish to do it.

In English, this concept is closer to reluctance to act or unwillingness to act.

Compare:

• A did not act. → A tidak bertindak.

• A was reluctant to act. → A enggan bertindak.

The second sentence contains information that is absent from the first.

Accordingly, translating omission to act as keengganan bertindak risks semantic addition: the translator introduces an element of mental state that is not inherent in the source term. Neither sense 3 nor sense 4 in Garner (2014:1260) contains any reference to willingness or unwillingness.

In A's case, it may well be true as a matter of fact that A did not want to help. But that is a conclusion about A's motive or state of mind, not the meaning of the word omission itself.

Thus, omission ≠ reluctance, and ketiadaan tindakan ≠ keengganan bertindak.

Why Not Kelalaian Bertindak?

The choice of kelalaian bertindak raises a different problem.

In Indonesian legal language, the word kelalaian carries normative weight. In the translation of Anglo-American legal texts, it is also very readily associated with negligence.

Yet omission is not identical to negligence.

A person may fail to act without that conduct constituting negligence in the legal sense. Conversely, an omission may form part of negligence when certain legal conditions are met, particularly when the person in question in fact owes a duty of care or another relevant legal duty.

The LII distinguishes between conduct that creates a risk and nonfeasance, that is, a situation in which a person takes no action to protect another. As a general principle, the duty of care does not require a person to ensure the safety of others if that person did not create the danger, although various exceptions exist (Legal Information Institute n.d.-c).

The word neglected in Garner's sense 4 does not change this conclusion. As noted above, it describes something left unattended, not a legal finding of fault.

Translating omission directly as kelalaian therefore risks doing something that should be methodologically avoided in legal translation: assigning a legal characterization before the source text itself does so.

Facts and Legal Characterization Are Two Different Things

The difference can be stated simply.

The statement A did not act is a description of conduct.

By contrast, A was negligent in failing to act is already an evaluation of that conduct.

A translator must not turn a description in the source text into a legal conclusion in the target text without a basis in the source text. The more neutral the source term, the more carefully the translator must preserve that neutrality.

So What Does Omission Mean in Common Law Criminal Law?

This is where linguistic analysis meets legal analysis.

In Anglo-American criminal law, criminal liability generally requires a physical element of the offense, commonly called the actus reus. The actus reus usually takes the form of a positive or affirmative act.

Unlike positive actions (acts of commission), failing to act does not usually create legal liability on its own. An omission becomes unlawful only when a person has a specific, recognized legal duty to act and fails to meet it.

In certain circumstances, however, this element may also be satisfied by an omission. The LII explains that the actus reus may take the form of an omission, but only when a person has a duty to act and fails to perform that duty (Legal Information Institute n.d.-b). The Model Penal Code adopts the same structure: liability may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless the law defining the offense expressly makes the omission sufficient, or a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law (American Law Institute 1985, § 2.01(3)).

Doctrinally, therefore, there is a distinction between:

• not doing something; and

• not doing something that one is legally required to do.

The latter may give rise to criminal consequences. The former does not necessarily do so.

There Is No General Duty to Rescue

One defining feature of traditional common law doctrine is that a person has no general legal duty to rescue, protect, or assist another person who is in danger. This is often called the "no-duty-to-rescue" rule.

The rule applies even when rescue would be easy and would involve no risk to the rescuer. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the principle clearly: the fact that a person realizes, or should realize, that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not, by itself, impose on him a duty to take such action (American Law Institute 1965, § 314).

The same principle governs both branches of the law:

• Criminal law. A moral obligation alone does not create a legal duty to act. A failure to act becomes criminally relevant only if a legal duty exists (Legal Information Institute n.d.-b).

• Tort law. A bystander who did not cause the peril generally owes no duty to help the person in danger and therefore cannot be held liable in damages merely for failing to help (Legal Information Institute n.d.-d).

The rule reflects a long-standing distinction in common law between misfeasance (doing something harmful) and nonfeasance (failing to do something beneficial). Liability is readily imposed for the former; liability for the latter requires a specific legal basis.

This is what makes A's case so interesting.

Morally, A should have rescued B. Legally, however, another question remains: was A required by law to rescue B?

These two questions are not identical. A moral duty and a legal duty may coincide, but they are distinct categories.

Jones v. United States: The Duty Must Be a Legal Duty

One American case frequently used to explain criminal liability based on omission is Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

The case involved the death of an infant and a charge of involuntary manslaughter based on a failure to fulfill a duty of care.

What matters most about the decision for our discussion is the court's emphasis on legal duty. The court identified at least four situations in which a failure to act may constitute a breach of a legal duty:

1. where a statute imposes a duty to care for another;

2. where one stands in a certain status relationship to another;

3. where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; and

4. where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded that person as to prevent others from rendering aid.

Most importantly, the court stressed that the duty on which liability is based must be a legal duty, not merely a moral obligation.

Modern doctrine also recognizes other circumstances that may give rise to a duty to act, such as when a person creates a risk or peril that then calls for a particular action. These situations are exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule. They do not displace the rule itself.

Two Situations in Which an Omission Can Occur

An omission to act can occur in two different situations, and only one of them is a breach of the law. The two definitions discussed earlier correspond to these two situations.

Situation 1: There is a responsibility to act. This is the situation captured by the LII definition: a failure to act in circumstances where there is a responsibility to act (Legal Information Institute n.d.-a). Because a legal duty exists and is not fulfilled, the omission is unlawful. It constitutes a breach of a legal duty. Whether criminal or civil liability ultimately follows still depends on the remaining elements, such as causation, the required mental state, and damage.

Situation 2: There is no responsibility to act. This situation is covered by Garner's more general definition: "the state of … not having been done" or "something that is … left undone" (Garner 2014:1260). That definition does not require any responsibility to act, so it also applies where no legal duty exists. Here, the omission is not unlawful. It may be morally blameworthy, but under the no-duty-to-rescue rule it is not a breach of the law.

In summary, the two situations compare as follows.

Situation 1 (a legal duty to act exists). The matching definition is the LII definition: a failure to act where there is a responsibility to act. The omission is unlawful because it breaches a legal duty. Example: A, the on-duty lifeguard, does not rescue B. In Indonesian, ketiadaan tindakan remains the neutral term for the concept; once the text establishes the duty, kegagalan bertindak or kegagalan memenuhi kewajiban hukum is also accurate.

Situation 2 (no legal duty to act exists). The matching definition is Garner's: the state of not having been done, or something left undone. The omission is not unlawful. Example: A, the vacationing lifeguard, does not rescue B. In Indonesian, the accurate term is ketiadaan tindakan; renderings that presuppose a duty, such as kegagalan memenuhi kewajiban hukum, do not apply.

The logic can be reduced to two questions, asked in order:

1. Was an act not done? If yes, there is an omission. This is a linguistic question, answered by the meaning of the word.

2. Was there a legal duty to do it? If yes, the omission is unlawful (Situation 1). If no, it is not unlawful (Situation 2). This is a legal question, answered by the law, not by the dictionary.

The word omission itself answers only the first question. A translator should therefore choose an Indonesian term that also answers only the first question and leaves the second to the law. Ketiadaan tindakan does exactly that.

Returning to A: Does His Profession as a Lifeguard Obligate Him to Help?

We can now return to the original illustration.

A is, indeed, a lifeguard. The fact that a person has particular professional expertise, however, does not by itself mean that the corresponding professional duty follows that person wherever he goes.

In this example, we assume that:

• A is on vacation;

• A does not work for the hotel;

• A is not on duty as a lifeguard;

• A has no special relationship with B;

• A did not cause B to fall into the pool;

• A has not begun any attempt to rescue B; and

• no specific statutory provision expressly requires A to render assistance.

Under these assumptions, A is essentially in the position of a bystander. Under the no-duty-to-rescue rule described above, A's ability to rescue B does not, in itself, answer the question of his legal duty.

In other words: ability to rescue ≠ legal duty to rescue.

A person may be fully capable of performing an act without the law requiring that person to perform it. That is the heart of the matter.

What If A Is on Duty?

Now change one fact. A is not on vacation. He is the lifeguard on duty at that pool.

B falls into the pool within the area under A's supervision, but A does nothing.

The legal analysis changes. Why?

Not because the linguistic meaning of omission has changed. Omission still describes "the state of … not having been done" (Garner 2014:1260).

What has changed is the legal status of that absence of action. In the second scenario, there may be a source of legal duty, for example a contractual duty or a duty arising from A's professional position. This corresponds to the third situation identified in Jones v. United States.

The structure of the analysis is therefore:

1. Omission: an act was not performed.

2. Duty to act: was there a legal duty to perform that act?

If there is no legal duty, the absence of action does not, in principle, serve as a basis for liability merely because a moral obligation exists. Only if there is a legal duty can the omission acquire legal significance as an element of the actus reus, subject to the other elements of the offense in question.

In the terms of the previous section, A on vacation is in Situation 2, while A on duty is in Situation 1. The word omission is the same in both scenarios; only the legal context differs.

So Does Omission to Act Mean That the Act Is Optional?

Here lies an intriguing trap in reasoning.

From A's example, we might be tempted to conclude: because A was not required to help, an omission to act means an act that one may either perform or not perform.

That conclusion is not accurate.

What was optional for A in that example was the rescue itself, under the legal norm assumed to apply. It was not the meaning of the word omission. Omission does not mean "something that one is free not to do." It merely indicates that an act was not performed, or, in Garner's words, something "left undone."

Whether the act not performed was required, prohibited, permitted, legally neutral, or required only as a moral matter is a separate legal question.

In other words, optionality is a normative attribute of the act, not a semantic component of the word omission.

This distinction explains why keengganan bertindak may seem plausible when one first hears the illustration, yet does not withstand more rigorous linguistic analysis.

Testing the Four Potential Equivalents

Once the source concept is understood, we can return to the translation problem.

1. Keengganan bertindak

This equivalent is not sufficiently accurate. Keengganan denotes a mental state of reluctance or unwillingness. Omission does not inherently contain that element.

Thus, reluctance to act → keengganan untuk bertindak, but not omission to act → keengganan bertindak.

2. Kelalaian bertindak

This equivalent is also problematic when used generically. Kelalaian readily carries the meaning of negligence or, at the very least, some form of fault. Meanwhile, the existence of an omission does not yet prove that the person was negligent.

By choosing kelalaian, the translator risks turning a fact of non-action into a normative characterization of fault.

3. Kegagalan bertindak

This equivalent comes closer in meaning. It corresponds to the English expression failure to act, which is commonly used in explanations of omission, including by the LII (Legal Information Institute n.d.-a; n.d.-b).

However, the word kegagalan (failure) may carry a slight implication that something should have been, or was expected to be, done but was not.

Where a legal duty has in fact been established, this equivalent is entirely apt. For example, failure to act despite a legal duty may be translated as kegagalan bertindak meskipun terdapat kewajiban hukum.

But for the term omission to act in A's case, where no legal duty has been established, a more neutral equivalent is available.

4. Ketiadaan tindakan

Linguistically, ketiadaan tindakan introduces the least additional information. Ketiadaan denotes a state of "not existing," and tindakan denotes an act. Thus, ketiadaan tindakan conceptually expresses absence of action.

This equivalent corresponds closely to Garner's sense 3, "the state of … not having been done." Like that definition, it describes a state in which an act does not occur.

It does not say that A was reluctant, negligent, at fault, in breach of a duty, or guilty of a crime. It simply preserves the basic fact embodied in the concept of omission: the relevant act did not occur.

Moreover, because omission is a noun, ketiadaan tindakan also preserves the grammatical category of the source term better than the verbal form tidak bertindak (not acting) when the term is being discussed as a legal concept.

Why Not Simply Tidak Bertindak?

Semantically, tidak bertindak is in fact very good and, in ordinary sentences, often more natural.

For example, A failed to act when B fell into the pool may naturally be translated as A tidak bertindak ketika B jatuh ke kolam.

However, when omission to act is treated as the name of a concept, as in an article on terminology, a nominal form is more appropriate.

Compare The issue concerns an omission to act with Persoalan tersebut berkaitan dengan ketiadaan tindakan.

The form ketiadaan tindakan preserves the nominal character of the source concept while avoiding the addition of normative content.

There is, therefore, a difference between a terminological equivalent and a contextual translation within a sentence:

• As a terminological equivalent: omission to act → ketiadaan tindakan.

• In certain sentence structures: failed to act / did not act → tidak bertindak.

But Indonesia Follows the Civil Law Tradition

At this point, another question may arise. If omission to act is a concept discussed within the framework of American common law, while Indonesia is generally classified within the civil law tradition, must we look for an Indonesian legal concept regarded as its equivalent?

Not necessarily. This is a fundamental issue in cross-system legal translation.

The translator is not converting American law into Indonesian law. The translator is conveying a message that originated in the American legal system into the Indonesian language.

The target language and the target legal system are not the same thing. A document may be written in Indonesian yet still address the law of the United States, England, Australia, Singapore, or another country.

Consequently, a translator must not force a common law concept into an Indonesian legal category merely because the translation is in Indonesian. On the contrary, where there is no perfect doctrinal equivalence, a descriptive and neutral equivalent is often safer than an Indonesian legal term that carries different doctrinal consequences.

In the case of omission to act, ketiadaan tindakan offers precisely that advantage. It is an Indonesian expression capable of carrying the source concept without automatically implying that the concept is identical to a particular doctrine in Indonesian law.

An Important Caveat: American Common Law Is Not a Single, Unchanging Rule

The statement that a bystander has no general duty to rescue should be read as a baseline rule in the common law tradition. It is not a claim that every U.S. state applies that rule without modification.

The United States has a federal system, and much of criminal and tort law is state law. Legislation may create duties that do not exist under traditional common law. The LII notes that a number of jurisdictions have modified the common law rule on the duty to rescue through specific statutes (Legal Information Institute n.d.-d). Vermont, for example, has enacted a statute requiring a person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm to give reasonable assistance, if this can be done without danger or peril to himself.

Accordingly, in analyzing a concrete case, the inquiry must not stop at "What is the common law rule?" It must continue with "Does the relevant jurisdiction have a statute that modifies that rule?"

In A's illustration, we are discussing the common law principle as an academic construct, on the assumption that there is no specific statutory duty or other source of legal duty that would alter the outcome of the analysis. This limitation is important so that an academic illustration is not mistakenly treated as a legal opinion on an actual case in Florida.

Why This Matters to Clients: A Case Study in Legal and Financial Risk

A single mistranslated term can shift a loss of billions of rupiah from one party to another. The following hypothetical case shows how this can happen with omission to act in a bilingual contract.

The setting is an indemnity clause in a service agreement between a foreign company (the Company) and an Indonesian contractor (the Contractor). The agreement is drafted in English and translated into Indonesian.

1. The Source Text

12.1 The Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Company against all losses, damages, costs, and expenses arising from any act or omission to act of the Contractor, its employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of this Agreement.

The scope of this clause is broad. It covers any act and any omission to act, whether or not the Contractor was at fault. The Company does not need to prove that the Contractor was negligent.

2. Version 1: Translation by a Translator or an AI Tool

12.1 Kontraktor wajib mengganti rugi dan membebaskan Perusahaan dari segala kerugian, kerusakan, biaya, dan pengeluaran yang timbul dari setiap tindakan atau kelalaian bertindak Kontraktor, karyawannya, atau subkontraktornya dalam pelaksanaan Perjanjian ini.

At first glance, Version 1 reads fluently. The pairing of tindakan with kelalaian is also widespread in Indonesian contract practice. That frequency is precisely why AI tools and translators working under time pressure tend to reproduce it.

3. Version 2: Proposed by the Author as Editor

12.1 Kontraktor wajib mengganti rugi dan membebaskan Perusahaan dari segala kerugian, kerusakan, biaya, dan pengeluaran yang timbul dari setiap tindakan atau ketiadaan tindakan Kontraktor, karyawannya, atau subkontraktornya dalam pelaksanaan Perjanjian ini.

Editor's note: ketiadaan tindakan preserves the neutral scope of omission to act. It covers every omission, whether or not it was negligent, exactly as the source text does.

Legal Risk Analysis

The problem with Version 1 is that it changes the scope of the indemnity.

In Indonesian civil law, kelalaian is a concept of fault. Article 1366 of the Indonesian Civil Code (KUHPerdata) makes a person liable for loss caused by his kelalaian or kurang hati-hati (lack of care). An Indonesian reader, judge, or arbitrator may therefore read kelalaian bertindak as a negligent omission, not any omission.

On that reading, the Contractor can argue that the indemnity covers only omissions that were negligent. The burden shifts to the Company to prove negligence, a requirement that does not exist in the English text.

The discrepancy also matters because the Indonesian version may carry decisive weight. Law No. 24 of 2009 requires Indonesian to be used in agreements involving Indonesian parties (Article 31). Presidential Regulation No. 63 of 2019 allows a foreign-language version alongside the Indonesian text and provides that, where interpretations differ, the language agreed by the parties prevails (Article 26). If the parties chose Indonesian as the prevailing language, or made no clear choice, Version 1 may become the operative text.

Financial Risk Analysis

Consider a hypothetical loss. A subcontractor of the Contractor fails to submit a mandatory notice to a regulator. The Company is fined, the project is delayed, and the total loss reaches Rp2 billion. The Contractor argues that it followed all of its internal procedures and was therefore not negligent.

Under Version 1 (kelalaian bertindak), the indemnity is arguably limited to negligent omissions. The Company must prove the Contractor's negligence, and the Contractor is likely to dispute the claim. The Company may be left with up to Rp2 billion unrecovered, plus legal fees and management time. A further dispute may arise over which language version prevails.

Under Version 2 (ketiadaan tindakan), the indemnity covers every omission, as in the source text. No proof of fault is required, and the Contractor has little basis to dispute coverage. The loss is recoverable under the clause as the parties intended, and no dispute arises from the translation itself.

The other tempting renderings carry similar risks. Keengganan bertindak would narrow the clause even further, because it suggests that the Company must show the Contractor was unwilling to act. Kegagalan bertindak is closer, but it may suggest that a pre-existing duty to act must first be proved.

The lesson for clients is direct: an error in a single term can rewrite the allocation of risk in a contract. The cost of having a specialist legal editor review a clause is a small fraction of the cost of a single dispute over its meaning.

From the Dictionary to Conceptual Analysis

The case of omission to act shows why legal translation cannot be carried out merely by searching for the word that appears to have the closest meaning.

If the translator stops at word association, the result may be omission → kelalaian. If the translator interprets A's conduct, the reasoning may be: A was actually able to help but did not want to → keengganan bertindak.

Both lines of reasoning have a certain logic. A careful reading of a legal dictionary, however, already points in a different direction: Garner (2014:1260) defines omission in terms of something not done or left undone, without reference to motive or fault.

When the term is examined more closely, we find three layers that must be kept separate:

The linguistic layer. What does the word omission denote? In A's case, it denotes the absence of an act: "the state of … not having been done" (Garner 2014:1260).

The factual layer. What did A actually do or not do? A did not perform a rescue.

The legal layer. Does the law impose on A a duty to perform the act he did not perform? Assuming there is no legal duty to rescue, A's absence of action does not, in itself, form a basis for criminal liability under the common law principle discussed.

These three layers must not be conflated.

Conclusion: What Is the Most Accurate Equivalent?

Based on both linguistic analysis and an analysis of common law doctrine, the most accurate terminological equivalent of omission to act in A's case is ketiadaan tindakan.

This choice rests on six considerations:

1. It is consistent with the dictionary meaning of omission: "the state of … not having been done" and "something that is … left undone" (Garner 2014:1260).

2. It preserves the nominal character of the source term.

3. It conveys the core semantic component of omission: an act was not performed.

4. It does not add a mental state, as keengganan bertindak does.

5. It does not add a characterization of fault, as kelalaian bertindak potentially does.

6. It does not presuppose a duty left unfulfilled, which makes it more neutral than kegagalan bertindak in a setting where, under the no-duty-to-rescue rule, no such duty has been established.

Thus: omission to act → ketiadaan tindakan.

This does not mean, however, that every occurrence of the word omission must be mechanically translated as ketiadaan tindakan. Context remains decisive:

• If the sentence emphasizes that someone did not do something, tidak bertindak may be more natural.

• If the text explicitly addresses the failure to fulfill a legal duty, kegagalan bertindak or kegagalan memenuhi kewajiban hukum may be more accurate.

• Only if the source text actually uses negligence does kelalaian become the relevant equivalent.

In other words, the goal of terminological research is not to find a single Indonesian word to be used in every situation. Its goal is first to identify the source concept and then to determine the most accurate equivalent for a particular context.

A's illustration offers an excellent lesson in this regard.

A did not act.

Was A reluctant? Not necessarily.

Was A negligent? Not necessarily.

Did A break the law? That depends on whether the law imposed on him a legal duty to act, and under the traditional common law rule, a bystander has no such general duty.

What we can state, without adding anything to the source concept, is that there was ketiadaan tindakan: an absence of action.

That is where linguistic analysis meets legal analysis. And that is where the real work of the legal translator begins.

What This Means for Your Documents

If your organization relies on bilingual contracts, policies, or court documents, terms like omission to act deserve a second look before the documents are signed or filed.

AI tools and general translators tend to choose the most frequent rendering, not the one that preserves the legal effect of the source text. A specialist legal editor works differently: first identifying the source concept, then checking how the chosen Indonesian term will be read under Indonesian law, and finally confirming that the English and Indonesian versions allocate rights and risks in the same way.

That review applies equally to human translations and to AI output. In many cases, editing an existing translation is the fastest and most cost-effective way to remove this kind of risk.

About the author: The author is an English–Indonesian legal translator and editor who has practiced since 1990, specializing in contracts, corporate documents, litigation, regulatory and compliance texts, and banking, finance, and insurance documents. Services include translation, editing, revision, and post-editing of machine translation. More information is available at doelkiteppenerjemah.id/en.

References

American Law Institute. 1965. Restatement (Second) of Torts. St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers.

American Law Institute. 1985. Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments). Philadelphia: American Law Institute.

Garner, Bryan A. 2014. Black's Law Dictionary. 10th Ed. St. Paul: Thomson Reuters.

Legal Information Institute. n.d.-a. "Omission." Wex. Ithaca: Cornell Law School. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/omission (accessed [date]).

Legal Information Institute. n.d.-b. "Actus Reus." Wex. Ithaca: Cornell Law School. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/actus_reus (accessed [date]).

Legal Information Institute. n.d.-c. "Duty of Care." Wex. Ithaca: Cornell Law School. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/duty_of_care (accessed [date]).

Legal Information Institute. n.d.-d. "Duty to Rescue." Wex. Ithaca: Cornell Law School. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/duty_to_rescue (accessed [date]).

Cases and Statutes

Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519 (Emergency medical care).

Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata (Indonesian Civil Code), Article 1366.

Undang-Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2009 tentang Bendera, Bahasa, dan Lambang Negara, serta Lagu Kebangsaan (Law No. 24 of 2009 on the National Flag, Language, Emblem, and Anthem), Article 31.

Peraturan Presiden Nomor 63 Tahun 2019 tentang Penggunaan Bahasa Indonesia (Presidential Regulation No. 63 of 2019 on the Use of the Indonesian Language), Article 26.